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It is by now widely recognized that investment decisions play
a major role in the determination of individual age—earnings pro-
files. Several studies, most notably Mincer [1974], rely on
investment in human capital as a leading single hypothesis from
which many of the observed regularities in earnings data are
derived.
The investment hypothesis, in its simplest form, can be
summarized by the equation:V
(1) Y =F(K,K)
where Y is observed earnings, K is potential earnings ("human
capitalt'), and IC is its rate of change. Competitive equilibrium
in the labor market places restrictions on the signs of the partial
derivatives. Specifically, so long as human capital contributes
to earnings (i.e., > 0), the individual must give up current
earnings in order to enhance future earning opportunities (i.e.,
< 0). It is typically assumed that, at each point in his life,
the individual faces a spectrum of earnings-investment combina-
tions("jobs"),and selects the one which is optimal.
Equation(1)highlights the formal similarity to the invert-
ment problem of the firm in the presence of adjustment costs
(see Eisner and Strotz [1963]). However, the fact that human
1/—
Thisprecise representation of the model is due to Rosen [1973],
but similar formulations are implicit in Becker [1964] and Ben—
Porath [1967].—2—
capital is embodied in the individual and cannot be sold leads
to several important differences. First, since the property
rights to human capital cannot be transferred, the finiteness
of life plays a central role in human investment. By contrast,
even a firmwhichplans tc'cashin its assets after a fixed
number of years will behave "as if" its horizon were infinite
so long as its assets are marketable. Seconds since either the
utilization or formation of human capital requires the sacrifice
of leisure (a specific consumption good), it is not possible in
general to separate the consumption and investment problems as
• 1/ is done in the theory of the firm.— Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, neither human capital nor the investment therein
are normally observable. Th-is investment functions, such as
those of Jorgenson [1963] and others, are not applicable to
human capital theory. If the model fails to generate testable
predictions about o!servable variables like wage rates and
earnings, then it is not a very fruitful one.
All of these features make the human investment problem
much more difficult theoretically than the firm's problem. Lack
of data on human capital leads to still another difficulty: it
is hard to distinguish empirically among the effects of investment
1/
See for example, Hirshleifer [1958).—3—
and a myriad of other influences on actual earnings. The most
obvious of these, of course, is the chcice of work intensity,
which affects both current earnings (labor-leisure choices) and
the rate of human capital accumulation (training-leisure choices).
The purpose of this paper is to present a simple. life-cycle
model of investment in human capital in which leisure choices
are explicitly incorporatel. In so doing, we integrate two pre-
viously disparate branches of life-cycle theory: models of
labor supply with exogenous ziges," and models of human capital
formation with exogenous ieisureA" Of course, to accomplish
this, we must posit utility maximization as the individual's
goal rather than income maximization.
Apart from the direct interest in the interaction of labor
supply and human investment over the life cycle, suèh a model
is needed to test the robustness of the widely-used wealth-
maximization models of human capital accumulation. For example,
a standard implication of these models is that a period of
specialization in investment (interpreted as schooling), if it
for example, Weiss [1972), Blinder [1974, Ch. 3], Heckman
[1974]. The paper by Weiss allows for endogeneity of wages due
to learning by doing, but not for human iPvestment.
1See, for example, Ben-Porath [1967],tqeiszacker [1967),
Sheshinski [1968]. Formally, our approach also embraces life-
cycle consumption theory, but we take pains to separate this
from the other two problems, and have little to say about
consumption.-4-
exists, will occur only at the beginning of life.' However,
one can imagine thatwhenschooling involves foregone leisure
the existence of pure time preference might lead a utility-
maximizing individual to postpone his education. Such possi-
bilities appear explicitly in our model. Another important
implication of, the wealth-maximization model is that the fraction
of time spent investing falls throughout the post-schooling in-
vestment period. This turns out to be generally true in our model
as well, though some exceptionc are noted.
To our knowledge, there have been four previous attempts
(all unpublished at this writing) to integrate human capital and
labor supply as we do here. The treatment by Becker and Chez
[1972] is the most general and explores the widest variety of
issues. But it is also the least ambitious in that they generally
content themselves with stating and interpreting the first-order
conditions. Our model can be viewed as a special case of theirs,
but a case which is pushed much farther. The three other studies1
at least attempt to analyze the shape of the optimal plan, and
naturally adopt simplifying assumptions in order to do so. Typi-
cally, the rate of investment in human capital and the supply of
labor are related to some key variable such as the stock of human
capital or its shadow price (both unobserved). However, since the
this, see Weiss [1971], Ishikawa [1973], and also the references
cited in the preceding footnote.
21Heckman [1975], Landsbergar andPassy[1973], Stafford and
Stephan [1973].—5-
models generally do not fully determine the behavior of these
endogenous variables, a disturbing and unnecessary amount of
ambiguity remains. Further, except for Beckman [1975], virtually
no attention is paid to periods of specialization such as schooling
or retirement. This seems a major omission.
The model presented here is more general than previous work
on the subject (with the exception of Becker and Chez), and yet
generates many more concrete conclusions. Among the restrictions
which our model places on opttnal plans are:
(a) Several distinct patterns in investment, work and
leisure may arise, depending on the subjective
rate of impatience (i.e., the discount rate for
future utilities).
(b) We consider the case where the rate of impatience
is"small" (in a sense to be defined later) to
bethe leading case. We show that in this case
specialization in schooling can only occur at
the beginning of life, while retirement can only
come at the end.
(c) Schooling is followed by a period of on-the-
job training, during which the fraction of
potential earnings and time devoted to human
capital formation declines monotonically.-6—
Cd) Investment reaches zero some finite time before
retirement(or death, if there is no retirement).
Thusthere is a finite interval of "pure work"
with no investment late in life. This econo-
metric finding of Ilincer [1974] is explicitly
ruled out by the Ben-Porath [1967] formulation
of the problem (which is followed by Reckman
[1975] arid by Stafford and Stephan [1973].
(e) The demand for leisure over the life cycle is
"U-shaped", with a tendency to decline during
schooling and the early part of 031, and
thereafter to rise.
(f)Wagesrise to a single peak, which occurs
afterthe peak in hours of cyork.
Of course, we do not pull these rabbits out of the proverbial
hat.Likeother investigators, we have to make somesimplifying
assumptionsof which two seem most crucial. First, (I) is given
the special form:
(2) 1 =F(K,K)=lCgflC/K),g' 'CQ.
The nature of this important function is the subject of the next
section. Here we only wish to point out that the formulation is
quite similar to that of Rosen [1973] who dealt with the special
case F(K,TC)=K —C(LC),C'(IC)>O. Inboth specifications, K is
defined as earning capacity, i.e., the amount the individual would—7—
earn in the absence of investment. While Rosen orders jobs by
their absolute rate of increase of earning potential (K), and
deducts costs additively, we order jobs by their proportionate
rate of growth in potential earnings (K/K), and deduct costs
multiplicatively. In principle, either representation is as
good as the other, but the multiplicative version leads more
naturally to the logarithmic wage functions encountered so fre-
quently in empirical work (Weiss [1974]).
Our second important assumption is that, for a given input
of time, the quantity of humau cnpital created is proportional
to the stock of human capital. In the terminology popularized
by Ben—Porath [19673, the "human capital production function"
is homogeneous of degree one in K. This specification which is
suggested by Mincer's work [1974], simplifies the mathematics
considerably. Thus it is both "realistic" and convenient, a
combination encountered all too rarely in mathematical economics.
147e do not wishto oversell this assumption. Hackman's [1975]
empirical work certainly does not support it.-8-
2.The Earnings-Invetmen Frontier
Basic to any model of human capital is the market constraint
delimiting the combinations of current earnings and human capital
formation which are obtainable from a given stock of human capital.
This function, which we call the "earnings-investment frontier",
is defined implicitly by (1). It is clearly downward sloping.
Several frontiers, corresponding to different levels of K, are
depicted in Figure 1. (If there is depreciation, K can be negative.)
Our special form (2) enables us to divide both axes of Figure 1 by
K, so that a single frontier, applicable to K, can be drawn.
Thus it plays for us the role that constant returns to scale plays
in growth theory. The frontier is sketched in Figure 2, where the
new symbol, x, has replaced + &.Asindicated in the introduction,
we index jobs by their proportionate rate of growth. x is this in-
dex, and it runs from zero to unity. xI indicates the job which
yields the maximum feasible rate of growth. It makes sense to call
this "going to school", and to specify that g(l) =0,i.e., that
allearnings are sacrificed during schooling. Conversely, x =0
is the job where potential earnings are fully realized, so g(O) I.
The locus is a "frontiet4' in the usual sense: points (like
p) in the interior are feasible, but never would be optimal; points
(like q) beyond the frontier would be preferred by the worker, but
are not attainable.cJe know, of course, that g'(x)cO, but can we
say anything about its convexity? The answer is that' we can rule










The specific earnings-in-.restrient frontier
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seem possible. The argument is simple. If g(x) were in fact con-
vex, as in Figure 3, and arbitrage was permitted, no worker would
accept a job with 0 C x < 1. This is because he could always
spend a fraction A of his work day at x0 and a fraction 1-A
school (x =1),thereby creating for himself an opportunity set
portrayed by the straight line g(x).= l-x (shown in Figure 3 as
a dotted line).!' Since this line dominates his market oppor-
tunities he would never deal with the market. Employers offering
jobs with 0 C x C 1 would have to raise wages until evelEy job was
at least as attractive as arbitraga.
Can a similar argument be used to rule out concive g(x) func-
tions? We think not. Workers clearly prefer jobs above the
g(x) =l-xline to arbitrage. Thus, to ruLe then out,onewould
have to show that firms offering such jobs would suffer losses in
a competitive market. As this involves analysis of the production
functionsof the firms for both goods and human capital, such an
argumentwould rest on specific assumptionsabout these functions.
Afull analysis of the behavior of firmc in the human capital
marketis beyond the scope of this essay. We refer the interested
reader to Rosen [1972], who argues that,due to diminishing returns,
the provision of training by firms requires increasing marginal
sacrifice Qf other outputs so that g(x) must be concave.
2JTheargument clearly assumes no frictions in moving between the
job and the school.
in—10-
While we consider both cases to be open possibilities, the bulk
of our analysis assumes g"(x) < 0. As we indicate Later, a model
almost identical to the present one can be constructed using a
linear frontier, g(x) l-x. There is only one important difference.
A concave frontier means that combining work with education on the
job is stric4ybetterthan blending attendance at school with a no-
training job, while the linear frontier means they are equally
good. If there is some positive interaction between earning arid
learning, the worker can capture some "pure profit" by on-the-job
training. Therefore, the "full wage" (including the value of
training), which is equated to the marginal rate of substitution
(NRS) between consumption and leisure for optiinality, exceeds his
potential wage by the amount of pure proCit. Only if g(x) =l-x
will there be no pure profits, so thrt the MRS is equated to the
potential wage, a conclusion which Becker and Chez reach in their
model (and claim to be very important).
The differences between g"(x) < 0 andg"(x) =0are at least
partly observable, in the latter case, workers should be found
"buying" training in schools just about as frequently as on the
job. In the former case1 training should be bought in schools
only during the period of specialization; part-time education should
take place predominantly on the job.—ii—
3.Statement of the Problem
The individual is assumed to derive utility from three sources:
the stream of lifetime real consumption, c(t); the time profile of
leisure, (t); and the bequest, or terminal value of real (nonhuman)
assets, Here t denotes the individual's age, and runs from
zero to T, the length of life which is assumed known and exogenous.
Specifically, lifetime utility is assumed to be additively separable
with a constant rate of time discounting
(3) fU(c,z)etdc ,
whereU(c,z) and B(A(T)) are asucaed to be twice-differentiable
strictly concave functions of their arguments, and p is what we call
the rate of impatience.V En order to nile out optimal paths with
segments of zero consumption or zero leisure, we further assume:
Urn U (c,L) for all £
c
Urn 1J2(c,&) =w forall c.
£40
Finally, to allow retirement as an endogerious decision, we exclude
from our analysis functions which preclude loot leisure. Letting
Z(t) denote the fraction of available time devoted to leisure, thIs
amounts to assuming that U1(c,L) > 0 for any c.
will be assumed that a person's human wealth dies with him,
i.e. cannot be bequeathed.
variable rate of impatience could be accomodated without too
much difficulty. But it would make the notation more cumbersome,
and qualitative results would depend on the time profile of p(t).—12—
What are the constraints on this maximization problem? To
begin with, there are two constraints onthetime budget. Letting
h(t) denote the fraction of time devoted to market activity (in-
cluding work and education), we have:
(4) h(t) + &(t) =1
(5) h(t)>O
As noted above, the occupational index is bounded between zero
and unity:
(6) Occ(t) <1
And, finally, the differential equations governing the change in
the stocks of human and nonhuman capital are respecti":ely:
(7') K =(x,h,K)
(8') A =rA+Y(x,h,K)-c
where r is the real rate of interest,i" the function (.)isthe
production function for human capital, and Y() gives earnings as
a function of the job, the number of hours worked, and the level
of human capital. This is actually considerably more general than
the problem we solve. We begin this way in order to show explicitly
how our simplifying assumptions reduce the problem to manageable
proportions. There are two initial conditions, correspondinq to
Letting r denote the realrateof interest implicitly incorporates
changes in the price of consumer goods. To see this, note that if
P were the price of goods and I were the nominal rate of interest,
the change in nominal financial assets would be given by:
t(AP) i(AP)+PY —eP.
But j-(AP)= Al + P4, so dIviding both sides of the equation by P
leads to; A(i —-)A+ Y —c,which Is (8').-13-




and both terminal stocks are to be chosen optimally.
To set up this problem in a form suitable for the application
of Pontryagin's maximum principle, we substitute (4) into (3),
define shadow princes p()t for human capital and l.l(t)et for
financial wealth, and write the Hamiltonian function:
H(h,x,c,K,A,p,u) =ePt[U(c,l_h)+ p(x,h,K) + p(rA + Y(x,h,K) —c)1.
First order necessary conditions for a maximum are:'
(1.) at each instant, x(t), h(t) and c(t) are
chosen to maximize H, given K, A, p and
p. and subject to the constraints (5) and
(6);
(ii) =- a&(Ptp)for all t;
d -Pt (ut)—._ —(e)forall t;
(iv) K(T)p(T)0
(v) (T) 31(AT)
Since optimal consumption is always positive, the condition
for optimal c(t) is easily stated:
(9) U(c,g,)p.
interpreting these, it should be noted that K0 includes bath
the initial endowment of education and "ability", or whatever else
it is that determines productivity.
have been unable to prov±de a proof of sufficIency.-14-
And,from (iii)
(10) ii (p —r)ji
so the marginal utility of consumption grows or declines at a steady
exponential rate. The consumption-bequest plan has been analyzed
extensively elsewhere, and we shall pay little attention to it
1/ hereafter.—
Consider next the first—order conditions for optimal x and h,
assuming that an interior solution obtains for each (we shall worry
about corners presently). They cre:
(11") U&(c,&) = + IlYh(X,h,K)
(12") p4(x,h,K) + uY(xh,K) =0
We now introduce the following assumption, mentioned in the intro-
duction;
Al: The functions (x,h,K) and Y(x,h,TC) are
both homogenous of degree one in IC.
Specifically,
x,h,K) =(x,h)KandY(x,h,K) =y(x,h)K.
Thisreduces (ll') and (12") to;
(11') U(c,) =PK'(Xh).+t2Ky(x,h)
(12') PK(x,h) +pxy (x,1i) =0.
So Al transforms a problem with three state variables (p, p and K)
to one with only two state variables: pK, which is the shadow value
(in utils) of the stock of human capital; and K, which is the poten-
tial wage rate converted into utils.
i"See Atkinson [1971]or Blinder [1974, Ch. 2]. For a treatment
which ignores bequests, see Ynari [1964] or Weiss [1972].—15—
The next simplification comes from defining the occupational
index, x, in the way suggested in Section 2. Namely, x indexes
jobs in terms of equivalent schooling time, so that working h hours
at job x is equivalent (in the production of human capital) to
spending xh hours in school. Note that this is not a restrictive
assumption, but a convenient measurement convention which enables
us to write:
(13) cp(x,h) =4'(xh).
While the analysis could be carried out more generally, it
will keep things clear if we assume:
1.2: The hourly wage rate does not depend on
hours of work. In symbols: y(x,h)K =
g(x)hK.
This prevents the issues we wish to focus on ——especiallythe
interplay between human investment and work effort --frombecoming
clouded with other issues such as overtime pay or penalties for




Most of our broad results, including the general characteriza-
tion of the life cycle plan, can be obtained from these two equations
(and the corresponding inequalities for corner solutions). However,
to get certain more severe (and empirically testable) restrictions
on the optimal path, we need to make one of the followinglinearity—16—
assumptions:
A3: The function f(xh) is linear, i.e. £'(xh) =
a,for all x, h.
or
A3': The function g(x) is linear, i.e. g'(x) =
—1for all x.
The meaning of A3' is discussed in Section 2. What is the economic
interpretation of A3? Mincer [1974) has argued, both theoretically
and empirically, that the functional relation between potential
earnings and accumulated years of schooling (denoted by the symbol
S) takes the following specific form:
aS —6t Kye a
where iSisthe rate of depreciation of earning capacity (possibly
zero). Differentiating this logarithmically yields:
KaS—..
But, by the way we defined x, it is definitionally true thatS =
sowe have:
(7) '=axh—6.
As the reader will recognize, this is just our general human capital
production function (7'), modified as per Al, A3, and (13). To
wit, A3 is essentially equivalent to assuming thattheMinder wage
function holds.
.YThe reader familiar withWeiszacker [1967] or Sheshinski [1968)
will recognize this as an extension of their formulation to allow
for variable labor supply.—17—
Wepresent here the results of the thodel using A3, rather than
A3'. However, we have also worked out the model with A3',1" and
can report that the two models give identical results, with only
one exception. The exception was noted in our discussion of the
earnings-investment frontier: when the frontier is linear, there
is no distinction between the potential wage and the "full wage"
(to be defined below). Since neither is observable, this dif-
ference is probably subtle enough to be ignored. Mathematically,
nonlinearity in g(x) turns out to be almost a perfect substitute
for nonlinearity in f(xh), and equation (12) shows why this is so.
Clearly, either f" < 0, or g" C 0, but not both, is requtred for
a regular interior maximum for x. Making both functions concave
isa kind of "overkill" which complicates the mathematics con-
siderably (and, we would argue, needlessly). While weconjecture
that all of our results go through to this more general case, we
have bean unable to prove it.
To summarize, then, our model is the Daximization of (3),
subject to the constraints (4)—(6), and the differential equa-
tions (7) and:
(8)ArA+hiCg(x) -c
The first order conditions for optimal h and x, including now
1If f(xh) takes thespecial constant—elasticity form, this model
is very close to Heckinan's [1975].—18—




(15) h[apx + pKg'(l)J >0+x1
otherwise, h(apK + uKg'(x)J =0.-18a-
4.Interpretation of the Optimality Conditions
In the next section, we develop a phase diagram to assist us
in understanding when the individual elects one of the, three pos-
sible corner solutions (x =0,x =1,or h =0)rather than the
interior solution. To facilitate this, we will need one further
assumption:
A4: Instantaneous utility is separable in
consumption and leisure, Le., U(c,L) =
u(c) + v(&).
However, before doing this, greater understanding of the problem
can be achieved by recasting and interpreting the first-order
conditions.
Recall that p(t) and 1j(t) are, respectively, the shadow prices
(in current utils) of human and nonhuman rapital,' so the ratio,
p(t)Ip(t) =e(t),denotes the money price of human capital. Thus
we can define V(t) = e(t)K(t) as the money value of the human
capital stock, and trace of behavior of V(t) over time. To do
this, use condition (ii) to write:
(16) (p4-cS) -mcii-g(x)hK
-
Thenby (7) and (10):
(17) V =rV—hg(x)K.
Finally, since human capital cannot be cashed in at the and of life
(K(T) >0), the transversality condition (iv)iraplies that"(T) = 0.
VConsumption goods are the numeraire, hence thRre is no distinction
between a dollar of money and a unit of consumer goods.—19—
This terminal condition allows us to solve differential equation
(17) explicitly viz:
(18) V(t) =fe_r(T_t)h(t)g(x(.r))K(r)dt.
That is, V(r) is the present vzilue, in time t dollars, of future
earnings -—averynatural interpretation of the value of the
human capital stock. Equation (17) expresses the fact thatthe
optimal paths of the shadow prices, p(t) and p(t), will render the
individual incapable of making his human wealth grow faster than
the rate of interest, and he can achieve this limiting growth rate
only by staying in school (x =1).Looking at human wealth in
terms of time t =0dollars, (17) says that humanwealthstays
constant during schooling, and thereafter declines pE.ri passu
with earnings. Earnings, hg(x)K, are like withdrawals from a
"humanbank account" where interest iscompounded continuously at
rater.
Using the variable V(t), we can rewrite the optimality cortdi-
tion(15) in a form which is readily interpretable:
-g'(x)K =aVif 0<x<1
(15.') -g'(O)K > aV ifx =0
—g'(l)K < aV ifx =I
Here—g' (x)K is the marginal cost in terms of foregone earnings per
hour of raising x, and it can be shown that aV measures the marginal-19a-
1/ benefits in higher future earnings.—
Condition (15') can also be given the usual rate—of—return
interpretation:Let ir be the rate of interest that equates the
discounted benefits to the costs; that is, 11isimplicitly
defined by:
—g'x)K =a4e_t_t)h(t)g(x)K(r)dt
'Moreprecisely, let x(c), h(t) be the optimal policy, and consider
a deviation from this policy as follows:
=x(t)for t >+ror t C
= x(t)+ c for t1 CtCt1+ t
whileh(t) is tinchanged. Assuming separability of U(c,i) (which is
not required, but which simplifies the proof) a necessary condition
for the optimum is that such a shift leaves lifetime income unchanged.
Since nothing earlier than t1 can be affected, we might as well





where K(t) is the capital stock associated with the alternative pro-
gram. Specifically,
log lUt) =logIC(t) + Itl+tah(t)edt, t >t1
+ r.
tl
If we take limtJ,the first term (which clearly measures the benefitc)
tO e.r
goes to ah(t1)V(t1), the second term (which clearly measures costs)
goes to —h(t1)K(t1)g'(x(t1)), and the third term vanishes. The eauality
in (15') results from setting lint £1
t4-Oe-t
cO-20—
as the marginal internal rate of return. Then an equivalent state-




Thus during the schooling period (x =I),the internal rate of return
on human investment is strictly greater than the interest rate,
despite the fact that hours-of—study are variable..U During the
post-school investment period, the marginal rate of return is always
equal to the rate of interest. It is worth noting that these re—
suits hold for 2X arbitrary leisure profile, and are thts indepen-
dent of tastes. Therefore, one can verify ex. post whether individuals
have behaved optimally by computing the apropriate rates of return.
Of course, when labor supply is a choice variable, the rate of re-
turn is ill—defined as an ex ante concept.
Let us know turn to the condition for optimal work effort,
(14). When theta is no investment (x =0),wages are exogenous to
the individual,' and, in view of (9), (14) simply states that the
marginal rate of substitution is equal to the (potential and actual)
wage. Analysis of the age-hours profile is exactly as in our previous
VEquality holds at the instant of leaving school. For analogous
conditions in an income-maximization model, see Weiss [l971b].
course, part of the problem is to determine when the individual
will opt for leaving his waga exogenous.—21—
models of dynamic labor supply with exogenous wages.' Becker and
Ghez [1972] have claimed that this marginal condition also holds
when wages are endogenous, and that therefore for the analysis of
time-versus-goods substitution in consumption we need not worry
about why wages change. Tworemarkscan be made about this finding.
First, when there is investment, the observed wage and the potential
wage are very different. Nor is their behavior over tine identical;
we show later that during OJT the ratio of observed wage/potential
wage is monotonically rising. Second, as indicated earlier, the
MRSisequated to the poéentiaj. wage only in the special case of
a linear earnings—investment frontier. To see, divide trie left—
hand side of (14) by U0(c,.z) and the righthand side by l (they are
equal by (9)) to get:
Un p —= a—Kx÷ Kg(x). Uc




It is easy to verify that the function in square brackets is iden-
tically unity only in the case g(x) =1—x.Otherwise, it is
always ctrictly greater than unity (as long as 0 C x C1).We
call the righthand side of (19) the "full wage". Clearly the
first component, g(x)K, measures the current benefits per hour of
wor1c. That the second component, -xg'(x)K, measures the future
Weiss [1972), Blinder [1974, Ch. 3).-22—
benefits per hour of today's work follows from the preceding cal-
culation. That is, the second component of the "full wage" prices z
atits marginal (not average) value in computing the future bene-
fits. The full wage exceeds the potential wage by what we called
the "pure profits'1 from OflinSection 2.-23—
5.The Temporal Succession of Life—Cycle Phases
Due to the possibility of corner solutions, four qualitatively
distinct phases might occur in an individual's life cycle. Whether
each phase occurs, how long each phase lasts, and the temporal
order of the phases form the subject of this section. We give the
four phases descriptive names, and numbers which seem to indicate
a sensible ordering, as follows:!"
Phase I,Schooling: x = 1, h > 0
Phase II,0.fl: 0<x<l, h>O
Phase III, Work: x0, h>O
Phase IV, Retirement: h =0
Note that when h =0the value of x is arbitrary as is clear from
(15). Economically, this says that a retied person can be considered
as holding any job at all (and working zero hours).
To facilitate the exposition, we define two new state variables:
A(t) =ap(t)K(t)=thevalue (in utils) of humzn
capital, multiplied by a
ip(t)= u(t)K(t)=thepotential wage, converted to utils
andadopt assumption A4 (separable utility). Then the four phases




!'Qfcourse, we have to prove that Phase I comcs before Phase H,









(2O4) v'(l) >Xx+ ipg(x) for allxc[0,1].
It is clear from (21.1) and (21.3) that the precise shape of g(x)
strongly colors the likelihood and length of each phase. For
example, suppose ..gt(l)w,asin Figure tea. Then (21.1) makes
it clear that the individual will never specialize in schooling.
The reason is that there are jobs (x's very near unity) which are
nearly as effective as schooling in imparting skills, but which
pay a positive wage. So finiteness of -g' (1) is a minimal re-
quirement for schoolingto be possibla. We assume this is true.
As another extreme, suppose g' (0) =0,as in Figure 4b. Then
(21.3) shows that Phase III (work without training) is impossible.
This is because there would be a job with a wage arbitrarily close
to the no—training job, but which gave a finite amount of training.
To portray our model in (A,*) space we must locate the bound-
aries of each region. Assume first that h > 0, so we need only
worry about the pre-retirement phases. Since g(x) is continuous
from the left at x =1,(21.1) defines the boundary of the
schooling region as the ray, A =—g'(1),in Figure 5. Similarly,
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The four phases in (X,*)—space—24-
the boundary of the x =0region as the ray, A= .-g'(o)ip,in
Figure5. Finally, the boundary of the h =0("retirement") region
is given by the solution of:
CEv'(l) max {Xx+4'g(x))
O<x<l
This last boundary defines a convex'1 set such that forany pair
(x,,) inthe interior, the individual will allocate all of his
time to leisure.
In this space, the optimal trajectory can, in principle,
begin anywhere. But, since the trausversality condition is p(T) = 0,
it must terminate on the horizontal axis. This trivial obgervation
already establishes that anyone who ever works will indeed have
a Phase III, i.e. a finite period of work without OJT. In other
words, so long as we do not rule Phase III out of court by
1/
Define the function
G(A,4i) max (Xx +
0Cxc1
It Is obvious that, regardless of the shape of g(x):





for any 0 <y<1.ThIs says G(A,*) is a convex function, and the
equation G(A,ip) is our desired boundary. Note that when the
maximum is found at x =1,G(A,ip) =A;and when x =0is the maximum,
C(X,p) =Ci.Thusabove the —g'(l) ray, the boundary is A=; and below
the —g'(O) ray, the boundary is JF.—25—
assuming -g'(O) =0,Phase III must be last phase before retirement
(or death) in any optfral plan. We believe this makes sense, and
is an argument against using the Ben-Porath [1967] specification.
One other interesting observation can be made already. If
thepotential wage, is less than ,themarginal utility of
complete leisure, then the work activity is unattractive. Similarly,
if A < ,theschooling activity is unattractive. However, Figure
5 shows that there is a region where bothofthese inequalities
hold, and yet the individual chooses not to retire. This means
that, for some values of g,and,theoption of combining work
and schooling by On keeps the individual on the job when he would
othendse retire. It can be shown that this is a direct implica-
tion of the concavity of the earning-investment frontier.1"
To determine the nature of optimal trajectories in Figure 5,
it is necessary to know how A and 4i change over tine. Using the




where I Er—p&.Thesign of y turns out to be quite important.
During Phase I, since g(1) =0,x rises at the exponential
rate P, but the sign of 4'dependson the level of h if y > 0.
the case g(x) =1-x,the retirement regions expands to fill
the entire square.—26—
Specifically, the 'P= 0locus for Phase I (drawn in Figure 6) is
simply h =1/a, where h isa function of A by (20.1). Ify<O, 'P
is rising throughout Phase I (see Figure 7).
In Phase III, 'Pfallsor rises at the rate y, but the behavior
of A is not so simple. When x =0,equation (22) becomes:
(22') A =pA—a'Ph
where h is implicitly a function of 'Pby(20.3). It can be shown
that the A =0locus (depicted in Figures 6 and 7) begins at the
point A0, 4'=, slopesupwards, and intercects the -g'(O) ray
at a value of h corresponding tohA =—g'(0)."
Phase IV is the simplest. Herexrisesat the expornntial
rate p, while iPfallsor rises at the exponential rate 1. (See
Figures 6 and 7).
Behavior of the trajectory in Phase II is governed by the
pair of differential equations (22)—(23), with x and h implicitly
defined as functions of A and 'Pby(20.2) and (21.2). These can
be used to locate and analyze the two stationary loci: A=0and
=0.The task is rather arduous and uninteresting, and hence
.L'Proof: The Locus is definedby )= '1'h. By (20.3), as
from above, Ii +0.Xherefore A +0.Next suppose A = -g'(O)'P for
some point on the locus. Then álearly h =—g'(O)g.This establishes
the two end points. The positive slope follows immediatelyonce it
is noticed that (20.3) implies=
v"(&)























is relegated to the appendix, but a few simple properties can be
aeen immediately:
(a) When y C 0, iisalways rising in Phase II, as
indicated in Figure 7.
(b) When y > 0, there is a 'P= a locuswhich intersects
the -g'(l) ray at the point B in Figure 6 (When
x1, h =y/aon the locus, which defines point
B.), and which never touches the —g'(O) ray.
(Because ahx =ycannot be satisfied when x =0.)
Cc) The A =0locus is the same regardless of the sign
of :tintersects the -g'(O) ray at paint A
(If A =0while A =-g'(O)'J',then h =hA.),and
does not touch the x =1ray. .(Whenx1,g(x) =
0,so no positive A satisfies A = 0.)
We have drawn both loci with positive slopes. In fact, while they
bath must start this way (at points A and B), either slope or both
might turn negative. This is not important. What is important,
and what can be proven (see appendix) is that they always have a
unique intersection which is in Phase II, and that the A =0locus
cuts the ip= 0locus from below.
It is clear from Figures 6 and 7 that the temporal succession
of life—cycle phases will be quite different in the two cases. We
believe the Y > 0 case is more "realistic", and hence will concen-
trate an it. Our reason is that people with r ap(and, a fortiori,
I > 0 as long as 6 > 0) have an optimal consumption path which is
everywhere nondecreasing, while persons with p > r have a declining
optimal consumption path.!' Unfortunately, this cage is the more
'This simple identification ofrising or falling consumption paths
with r-P is true only under separable utility. For the more general
case, see Weiss [1972]. Our point is that this specific model be-
havesmast like the real world when r > p.—28-
difficult. The reason is a phenomemon we call "cycling", that is,
the recurrence of a specific phase more than once in an optimal
life cycle. For example, inspection of Figure 6 raises the pos-
sibility that it might be optimal to attend school, then take
OJT, and then return to school again. The reader will doubtless
note many other possibilities for cycling when y > 0, but there
is little room for cycling when y S0.
Let us, therefore, deal first with people with "high im-
patience", i.e. p > r +&." Thafollowing propositions, which
rather sharply delimit the kinds of life cycles that could ever
be optimal for such a person, follow by inspection of Figure 7.
(a) The only possibility of cycling is that an optimal
path might include two disjoint periods of work,
separated by a period of Ofl.
(b) If there is a period of schooling, it comes either
at the beginning of life or immediately after re-
tirement. A period of On follows schooling.
(c) If there is a period of retirement, it comes at
the beginning of life.!'
(d) If there is a period of Oft (and there will be
one unless the optimal path irzñudes no training
whatever), it is followed by a period of work.
(e) The last years of life are a period of work.
Thusthe "normal" life cycle for persons with high impatience
(depicted by the dotted path in Figure 7), assuming most people find
it optimal to take some schooling and some retirement, is roughly as
"Notethatif the rate of growth of wages inthe absence of invest-
ment, —6, ispositive (due to economy-wide prothictivity changes) and
exceeds the real rate of interest, then all persons are in this class.
—'Th2same phenomenon occurs in a dynamic laha supply moi'l w)Lh
exugenou wages. See WeIss [1972], Blinder [1974, Ch. 37.-29-
follows: an initial period of retirement is followed by schooling,
then by O.JT, and then by pure work until death.
Of course, life-cycles with early retirement are rarely ob-
served in practice. But this is not because such programs are
irrational. Individuals with very high impatience (or veryhigh
positive exogenous wage growth) will want to bunch their leisure
early in life. To do do, since consumption depends on lifetime
discounted earnings, they will have to work very hard when they
are old. We may surmise that it is the absence of perfect capital
markets that precludes all but inheritors of large fortunes from
pursuing such a program.
When impatience is lower, so that y =r+6-p> 0, cycles
seem to be possible. Section 7 is devoted to this issue. For
the moment, we simply assume that there are no cycles.-30-
Labor Supply and Human Investment in a Normal Life Cycle
It can be seen from Figure 6 that, if the life plan includes
schooling and has no cycles, the only possibility is: schooling
comes first, followed by On, work, and then retirement.!! We
therefore call this the "normal" life cycle, and this section is
devoted to examining its properties.
6.1 Phase I: Schooling
Since A is rising through time during Phase I, and
(20.1) v'(l—h) A
it is clear that h(t) > 0. That is, the amount of time devoted
to schooling rises steadily as education progresses --aprediction
to which all former graduate students will doubtless attest. The
intuition behind this is simply that the value (in utils) of the
human capital stock A( t )rises(even if K itself falls), making
leisure more expensive)1
We may also make some rough judgments on the concavity of




is actually not quite so obvious, since the diagram makes
it look as though retirement might come first. However, we show
in Section 7 thatthesameconditionsthat preclude cycling .also
preclude early retirement.
'Marginal calculations during this phase involve only leisure
and schooling. The work activity is dominated.-31-
Denotethe expression in brackets by R(h) > 0, and take the time
derivative again to get:
(24) R'(h)(h)2 + R(h)h =0
It is clear from (24) that h and R' (h) have opposite signs. What
is the likely sign of R'(h)? Noting that the time budget makes
dh/dL—l everywhere, we can write R'(h) as:
A ttlt' — — V —
d&v'(Z)
In the case of utility functions for choices involving risk,
the ratio v"(L)/v'() is called the degree of "absolute risk
aversion't (Pratt [1964]), and is generally thought to be an in-
creasing function of z(i.e.,to fall in absolute value as I
rises). While the present model does not discuss risk, it seems
reasonable to suppose that our v(.t) funct.on also hasthispro-
perty. In that case, (24) implies that h(t) < 0, i.e. that h is
a concave function of time during schooling.!! We take this to
be the leading case. And since in Phase I ah -&,therate
of growth of potential wages would also be an increasing arid
concave function of time.
Notethat all this is independent of y, and hence applies
equally well to individuals with high impatience.
insteadt < 0, hwill be a convex function of
time. £ •v (I)-32-
6,.2 Phase III: Work
Since there are some formal cimilarities between Phase I
and Phase III, it is convenient to take up next the case of
work with no training.
Here labor supply is governed by the usual condition:
that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption goods be equated to the real wage:
(20.3) v'(l—h) = u'(c)K.
Since, by (23), !J/$=-Y in Phase III, logarithmic differentia-
tion of (20.3) yields:
(25) Ii=-y=
sopeople with high impatience offer increasing amounts of labor
to the market, despite wages which are falling if 6 >0. Con-
trariwise, persons with more "normal" time discount rates have
diminishing labor supply in Phase III. It cannot be stressed
too much that these contrasting behavior patterns have absolutely
nothing to do with competing "income" and "substitution" effects,
although cross-sectional studies of labor supply might possibly
confound the two phenomena.
From (25) it is clear that the concavity issue is precisely
as it was in Phase I. The sign of Li depends only on the be-
havior of "absolute risk aversion" as £ rises, and the more
attractive utility functions imply i<0 (regardless of the
sign of y).—33.-
The behavior of wgrates(actual and potential coincide)
and earnings in Phase III is also of interest. Letting 14 be the
observed wage, we have:
U== -6,a constant.
So lgaritttnic age-wage profiles should be straight lines-in Phase
UI, which are falling, flat, or rising according as 6 is greater
than, equal to, or less than zero.
Finally, consider earning,Y(t) =h(t)W(t).We have:
i—n+.—n-a YhWh
If 6 > 0, i.e., if depreciation outweighs economy-wide wage growth,
earnings will surely decline. However, if 6 is sufficiently nega-
tive, they may not. But regardless of the slope of the logarithmic
earnings profile, it will certainly be concave if h(t) is:
<0 ifh<0.
6.3 Phase II: an—The-Job-Training
To analyze the behavior of hours of work and investment in
Phase U, it is convenient to transform the differential equations
so that x andh,rather than xandp.arethe variables. In (x,h)-
space, Phase II is the open unit square, Phase I is the vertical
line x =1,Phase III is the vertical line x = 0, and Phase IV is
thehorizontal axis. (See Figure 8.) In a life—cycle without
















Alternatk'e phase diagram in (x, h)—space-34-
The first-order conditions for an interior maximum are
(14') A+ g'(x)p=0
(15') v'(l—h) =Xx+g(x)$
Since the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in (x,h) for given (A,ip)
we know that (14')—(15') define x and h as unique functions of ? and
Given these, the two differential equations in A andcan be










is the (sign-corrected) elasticity of the g(x) function. This
important function has the following properties (as the reader
may verify by direct computation):
n(0) =if(0) =0
(28) n(l) =n'(l)=+
1(x)>0, n'(x) >0,forx >0.
Using (26) and (27) it is easy to partititon Figure 8 into
four regions by the =0and l =04.oc±. Mh—0. locus only exists for y>O
and tijereit has the simple form:
(29) n(x)= y/p
1'Uniqueness of A and iforgiven x and h is obvious since (14')
and (15') are linear in A and 4'.
21Theseequations are derived in the appendi::.—35—
which, by (28), defines a unique value of x. call this x. Using
(27), the end points of the x =0locus,
(30) r + 6 =ahx(1
can easily be determined. When x =I,h(r+6/a, and tthen x =C,
h = _gt(O) <. It can also be shown that the locus isup-
ward sloping.!'
It is clear from Figure 8 then, that h can be no less than
(r4o)/a at the start of Phase II.' But does the path proceed
smoothly from x =1to x =0with c < 0 everywhere, as in Figure
9a, or can "mini cycles" arise, as in Figure 9b? We can prove tint
trajectories like Figure 9b can never be part of an optical path
because (26) and (27) define c and h as functions of x and h only,
i.e., because c and Ii do not depend directly on either the state
variables or the costate variables. It therefore follows that
must be the same whenever (x,h) are. But a path like that
in Figure 9b would have to cross itself —-includetwo distinct
points in time with the same (x,h) and different (x,h) -—whichis
impossible. This is an important result, since it shows that
1Proof: Using the definition of n(x),and differentiating (30)
yields 1+(x) dli —g(x) +g(Z)g"(x) Oaxn(x) +ah
Since the term in square brackets is negative, we have
> 0.
a/We mustassume a > r + 6 if there is to be any training at all.—36-
within Phase II, x(t) is monotonically declining —-aproperty
which holds in the simple Ben-Pofath [1967] model, and which is
vital if human capital theory is to account for the gross facts.
It also implies that, within Phase II, labor supply rises to a
single peak and then declines --apattern which Stafford and
Stephan [1973] took great pains to establish the possibility of.
In our model, it is the only pattern which could ever be optimal
(so long as y > 0).
We can also use equation (26) to determine the concavity of
h(t). Letting R(h)—v"(L)/v'(&) as before, its time derivative
is:
(31) =''l.; —
Sincethe first term on the righthand side is negative, h < 0 fcr
utility functions with R' (h)
The behavior of potential wages, K(t), can be displayed con-
veniently on the (x,h) diagram. Since K/K =ahx-6,the K =0
locus (which exists only if 6 > 0) is the rectangular hyberbola,
hx=6/a, shownin Figure 10. By showing that the intersection
of the =0and 11 =0loci (labelled point A in Figure 10) 1iat
above this hyperbola, we will establish that the peak in lhbor
supplyprecedes the peak in human capital. Point A is defined
byandthe £whichsatisfies:
aa+ IlL:)) (x)
i'WhenK' (h) C 0, (31) is ambiguous a priori.However,we a1rec'y
knowhat there is a unique masinnrn(where ) =0),aGd it is ciCfl
that h C0 inthe neighborhood of this maximum.h
Figure 9a





















But ft(x) = yip,so:
h=1= + - whenr >p.
Sor > p is sufficient, though certainly not necessary, for the
peak in labor supply to precede the peak in human capital.
What about the peak in observed wages, w(t)=
Since:
W(t) =Kg'(x)x+ g(x)K
and since g'(x) and x are negative while g(x) is positive, the peak
in observed wages (ifany)must follow the peak in potential wages
(ifany).Of course, if 6 =0,both actual and potential wages
reach their peak at the Phase tI-Phase III swItch point, and are
level thereafter. Figure 11 below depicts the tima profiles of
labor supply, human capital, and observed wage rates in Phase II
for 6> 0. The peak in observed earnings, h(t)W(t), must cone
between the peak-in h and the peak in W, though its relation to
the peak in K is unclear. If the 6 = 0 case is a good benchmark,
earnings peak earlier than human capital.
Figure 11 shows wages andhoursof work rising together at
first (when wages are low), then moving in opposite directions
(when wages are higher), and finally falling together (when wages
are again low). Once again we stress that this has nothing what-
soever to do with income and substitution effects —-although
cross-sectional studies over diverse age cohorts might mistakenly
identify this phenomenon as a.backward bending labor supply function.—38—
One final observation. The rate of growth of human capital,
= ah(t)x(t) —6
m!ght rise at first in Phase II, but must fall for most of Phase
II. It will start out rIsingifthe slope of the trajectory, hI;,
exceeds the slope of the rectangular hyberbola hx =h1,where
is the labor supply at the start of Phase
6.4 The Complete Life Cycle
Now that we have analyzed each individual phase of the optimal
life cycle, we are in a position to put the results together and
describe the complete age profile of investment, work effort,
earning capacity, wage rates and earnings.
6.4.1 Investment inHuman Capital
We have seen that x(t) is constant et unity during Phase I,
declines monotonically during Phase II, and is constant at zero
during Phase III.(It is not a meaningful concept in Phase IV.)
To show that x(t) looks as portrayed in Figure 12, we need only
establish that it is continuous. Continuity within Phase II
follows frmediately from the fact that both A (t)and4,(t)are
continuous functions of time and that 4,(t)isstrictly positivo,
since:
(15') —g(x) =
'1Theprecise mathematical -candition is a complex one iavolvng.thc
firstandsecond derivatives of both the v(L) and g(x) functions,
and does not seem worth writing down. Note that the product xli
is what other writers have called "investment time". Investment






Tine profiles within Phase II
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Alternative g(x) functions giving discontimxaies in r(t) at 11-111




























and —g'(x) is monotonically increasing. Continuity across the I-fl
and 11-Ill switch points follows from:
urn =1,urn x(t) =0,
whichare immediate implications of the continuity and monotonicity
of g'(x). Examples of g(x) functions witich give discontinuous x(t)
either within Phase II or at a switch point are provided in Figures
13.1/ Nothingcan be said in general about the concavity of x(t)
within Phase II.
6.4.2 labor Supply
So far we have shown that h(t) is rising in Phase I, con-
tinues rising to a peak and then declines in Phase II, and declinos
throughout Phase III. It remains to show that h(t) and h(t) are
both continuous functions of time.
Continuity within each phase is trivial to establish. In
Phase I, v'(l-h) = x(t), A and v' are continuous, and v" <0.
In Phase II, y'(l-h) =ip(t),and the exact same argument works.
Finally, in Phase II, we have:
v'(l-h) =Ax+4ig(x)
and given our assumptions about g(x), both x and g(x)are continuous
functions of
1Nincer's empirical work, which findsa discontinuity in x(t) at
the end of schooling, suggests that Figure 13c is closest to tha
truth.
VThI5 argument makes itappear that continuity of h(t) requires
continuity of x(t). This is not so. x and g(x) wil! display
discontinuous behavior at the sm points in time. We only re-
quirethat Ax +tpg(x) be continuous. For excpic. optimal x(t)
isa d*ccontinuous function of tima when g(x)1-x, but in thIs
case xx + = vthichis continuous.-40-
To establish continuity at the switch points, we mustprove:
(i) urnAx+'pg(x)=A (i—il switch) x1
(ii) urn Ax +$g(x)=ip(n—ni switch)
x-'O
(iii) Urn h(t) =0,where H is the ageof retirement
(III—Iv) switch)
Conditions (i) and (ii) follow by inspection given only that x and
g(x) are continuous with g(O) = 1 and g(l) To prove (iii),
we use the condition:
iji(R)zv'(l-h(R))
to rewrite it:
Un tp(R) =L (Sinceh(B) =i).
Referringback to the phasediagramin Figure 6, it is apparent that
this must be true since *(t) is continuous.
What about the continuity of h(t)? Since v'Qi), v"(L) and
n(x) are well-behaved functions, and since we have juot seen that
x(t) is continuous, (26) Immediately implies that h(t) is continu3ua
within Phase II. Proceeding analogously, to prove continuity acrvss
switch points, we must show that:





Conditions (iv) and (v) follow immediately by noting that
11w fl(x)c +o'and lim 1(x) =0.However, h(t) is discontinuous across
x-O
the111—IS! switch since lim h(t) =X(1) <0.
t÷R
Again,we do not believe that continuity of x is needed. It is just
2that a different proof would be required.
—'This condition comes from comparing (26) which holds in Phase II,
with (-v"/v')h = p, which holds in Phase I.
This conditioncomes fram comparing (26) with (25), which hoLis in
Phac IT!.-41-
Collecting all these results, Figure 14 depicts the life-cycle
labor supply profile in the leadizg case: y E r—p+6 > 0, R'(h) >0.
In a word, the profile is smooth (except at retirement),single-
peaked, and has no inflection points.
6.4.3 Human Capital
During Phase I, K(t) rises at the increasing rate =
ah(t)-6.It x continue to rise at an increasing rate at the
start of Phase II where:
K Ct)
K(t) —ah(t)x(t)—6
but soon will rise at a decreasing rate, and eventually will de-
clir.e if and only if 6 > 0. Finally, K(t) falls at the steady
rate 6 in Phase III -—theonly phase where it is cbservable.
(See Figure 15.)
6.4.4 Actual Wage Rates
Observed wages, of course, are zero until the completion of
schooling and correspond to K(t) in Phase III. During Phase II
we have
log P1(t) = log K(t) + log g(x)
so that the slope of the logarithmic wage profile is:
P1(t) _K(t)-
w(t)K(t)(x)
This will always exceed K/K. Further, since as x +0both x and
approach finite limits, the time path of log W(t) willex-
hibit a kink at the Phase Il-Phase III switch point.(See. Figure
16.) Since nothing is known about x, nothing is known about its
concavity.time, t
tirito, t
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Figure 15
Humancapitalover the life cycle-42-
6.4.5Earnings
The log of earnings is given by:
log Y(t) =logh(t) + log hçt).
so:
Y hK x
During Phase I, of course, Y(t)=0.At the startofThese II,
all three terms are positive, so 1(t) is certainlygrowing.
Then h(t) peaks and begins to decline. If (and only if) 6 >0,
K(t) also peaks in Phase II. But -71(x)>0 throughout Phase
II, so there is no particular reason to think that Y(t) ever
declines in Phase II (though it might). Ofcourse, in Phase
III, h < 0 and =—6,soY falls unless 6 is substantiallynega-
tive. Figure 17 depicts several possible logarithmic earnings
profiles.Wage rates over the life cycle
Figure 17
Earnings over the life cycle
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'Ill. The Question of Cycling
We now tddress ourselves to two important questions which have
thus far been avoided:
(a) When cycling arises, what broad characterization of
the optimal path can be made?
(b)What meaningful conditions can be derived which ex-
clude the possibility of cycling?
In Section 6,weproved that the optimal trajectory can never
1/
cross itself.— This result enables us to answer the first question,
since it implies that cycles must be "expanding" as in Figure 18,
rather than "contracting". Thus a cycling path can be broken down
intoseveral "quasi-life—cycles", each beginning with a period of
schooling (with the possible exception of the first). Since the contourri of
constantwprk effort look like blow-ups of the border ofthe re-
tirementregion (which is the special case h = 0), with higher
contoursconnoting higherh, we see that the individual works
harderduring his second "quasi cycle" than in his first. Also,
ha spends more time in Phase II. So, in a program with cycling,
the tine profiles of x(t) and h(t) might look something like
Figures 19 and 20 respectively.
Recandevelop strong conditions which rule out cycles by
consideringthe minimum length of time required to complete a
"quasi cycle". If this time exceeds the available life, T,
then cycles are impossible. In particular, we focus on the last
1"Actually,we only proved that itcould never cross itself in































Labor supply with cycling-.44-
quasi cycle, and let:
to=age of startirAg lact schooling period
= age of starting last OJT period
= age of starting last work period
= age of ending last work period (possibly t3 = T).
These four points on the optimal trajectory are indicated in Figure
18.
Consider first the length of the schooling period,
t1-t0.
Sincewe are considering a cycling path, we know that:21
(32) h(t0) c y/a =rl-Ô—p
(See Figure lB.) Furthermore, we know from Figure 8 that:
(33) h(t1) >(r+6)/a
Finally, we know that optimal behavior implies that y'(lh) grows
at the exponential rate p in Phase I (see equation (20.1)). Thus
we can derive a minimal time required to pass through Phase I
which will depend on the rate of impatience, the elasticity of
the marginal utility function, and the parameters a, r and 5.
Specifically, since






(3b') e J" =
a
Note thatno such statement can be made about the schooling
period in a trajectory without cycling. Thus the bound to be
derived will not apply to "normal'1 life cycles.Equation (34)placesa lower bound on the intervalti—to which in-





Itis also intuitively clear that there must besome minimal period
of work during which the benefits fromschooling are realized. This
is the idea of our lower bounds on thelengths of Phases II and III,
which depend basically on the tradeoffs embodiedin the earnings—
investment frontier. To derive these bounds,recall our earlier
notation (p. ):e(t)=p(t)/p(t).
i/This laststatement holds under the assumption, introduced in Section
6,that >0.To prove it, let S be the root of (3i), viz:
—!Ii 2)=v'(l—
Sincethe righthand side of this expression isindependent of p, C0
foflows if we canshow: p
—!±÷ .Q)} > 0 3p 3*j a a
Now, adopting the shorthand notation a 1- (r+6)/a,this partial is:










Toprove this, define the function: f(L) 2log'i'(i). Then 2'(i)=
C 0and f"(L) > 0 by our assumption. Thus r(t) isgreater than
itsfirst—order Taylor approximation around£fl viz.:
-. f()>f(L)+
Letting.Q =÷, £=S as a special caseproves the desired ineuality.
Q.E.D.-46-
In this notation, t1,t2 and t3 are defined by (see Figure 18):
(35) ao(t1)
=—g'(i)
(36) ae(t2) =— g'(O)
(rr) e(t3) = o
Itis easy to show that:
(38) 0=(r+6)6—h[g(x) —xg'(x)]in Phase II
(39)8 =(r+o)-iiin Phase III.




Setting t = and using (35) and (36), we have:
=—g'(l)—a42e6t_t1)h[g(x)_xg1(x)]at,
Now, replacing h(t) in the integral by 1.0 and replacing g(x)-xg'(x)
by —g'(l) makestheintegral strictly larger, so we have the in-
equality:




>—g'(0) a r+6 g'(l)e




The bound depends on the parameters a, r and 6, and also on the
degree of concavity of the earnings-investment frontier.a" Tastes
should be clear that the bound applies equally well to the OJT
period of a normal life cycle, since the only things assumed were
that Phase II is preceded by Phase I and precedes Fhse III.
a'That is, on how much smaller -g'(O) is than-g'(l).-47-
are not involved since we obtained the bound by assuming the in-
dividual works as hard as he can.
Almost the same reasoning can be used to place a lowerbound,












1 a = gloga + g' (0) (v-I-a)
-
Againthe bound depends on a, r, ,andthe g(x) function.
Putting these results together, we find that there are boundc
on the minimum lengths of Phases II and UI which are the same for
every individual, and there is a bound for the minimal schooling
period which depends on p. Let p' be the value of p satisfying:
S*(p*) =T-- W*.
Then cycling is certainly impossible for persons with p <p*. Since
we know that cycling is only a problem when p c r + 8, a sufficient
(but far from necessary) condition to rule out cycling is: r +5
Thereader should note that the condition pp* rules out early
retirement in the y >0case as well, since the bounds S*(p*), 3*,
and W* apply here as well. In a word, we will never get cycles if-48-
either p is "larae" (i.e. p >r+5) or p is "small" (i.e., p c o).
If p* < r +6,there will be an intermediate range in which cyclin3
is possible.
It maybeinteresting to work out a numerical example of these
bounds. Suppose a, which would be the rate of return on human
capital in the case of an infinite lifetime, is 87., while r +6is
6%. A simple form for the earnings-investment frontier is thequad-
ratic: g(x) = 1 - Given these choices, (40) and (41)
can be used to compute: J*18.3, W'= 7.8. From (34) it is
clear that a facile choice of utility function 1st
v'(L) =e:t.
For a rate of impatience of p =.02,(34) gives S = 12.5 as the
minimal schooling period. Adding these, we find that a new
cycle cannot start unless there are more than 38.6 years remaining.''
1'The reader is remindedthat these are all weak lower bounds. The
actual anount of time taken by the last quasi cycle is thus strictly
greater (and probably considerably greater) than 38.6 years.-49-
VIII. In Conclusion
We have presented a life-cycle model of the behavior of a
utility-maximizing individual free to allocate his daily time
budget Bmong leisure, work and education. The mainsubstantive
conclusions are listed in Section 1, and depicted in Figures 12-
17. They need not be rehashed here.
Several generalizations of the analysis imediately come to
mind. More general forms of the human capital production function
could be tried, as could a non—separable utility function. Indeed,
the list of arguments of the utility function could be expanded
to include human capital, or, indeed, nonhuman capital. More im-
portant than all these, we imagine, would be allowance for the
capital-market imperfections that severely constrain the choices
of those poorly endowed with financial wealth.
Still, so long as we interpret the results as a benchmark
around which there will surely be deviations (some systcmatic,
some random), there are a number of interesting uses for the model.
First, it may be possible to do the usual kinds of ccmparativc-
dynamic exercises. How would an increase in initial fin2ncial
wealthalter the optimal plan? What about an increase in initial
humanwealth? Rowsensitive is the optimal plan to the rate of
impatience--ataste parameter that presumably differs across
people.1! The reader can no doubt think ofmartysimilarquestions.
11This question is addressed, in the context ofa far simpler model,
by Beach, Maital and Maital [1973].-50-
While we suspect that most of these can only be answered under
specific functional forms for v(Z) and g(x), some weak results
may hold in greater generality.
Second, tho model can provide the micro-foundation for a
simulation model of the income distribution, along the lines of
Blinder [1974]. The chief conclusion of that work is that the
distribution Of wage rates, talcen there to be exogenous, is the
principal contributor to income inequality. The present model
can generate that distribution endogenously, given assumed dis-
tributions of tastes and endowments, and thus can fill what is
perhaps the major gap in the positive theory of income distribution.
Third, the long—rim incidence of various taxes in a world
with human-capital accumulation is virtually unexplored territory.
It seems feasible to incorporate some simple taxes ——suchas a
linear income or wage tax -—intothe model and examine, either
analytically or through simulation, the effects of these programs
of the acquisition of human capital. It could be that human-
investment responds to taxation more substantially than do hours
of work.
In a word, there are a host of interesting and important
questions which simply cannot be addressed by a life-cycle model
which considers either labor—leisure choices or labor-education
choices, but not both.V By demonstrating the feasibility of
i/For example, if income maximization is the posited goal, apro-
portional tax (subsidy) on wages cannot possibly alter behavior.-51-
handling both decisions together, we hope to have hastened the
day when the powerful tools of life-cycle economic theory will
be brought to bear on these issues.A-i
Mathematical Appendix
The pwpose of this appendix is to establish the properties
of the *=0and A =0lines in the region in which
both x and h attain art interior solution. We wish to show that:
1. there exists a unique intersection
point.
2. At the intersection the line cuts
the ii= 0line from below.
Uniqueness
Notice first that the necessary conditions (l)—(l5) define
a unique (A,*) pair for any (x,h) pair. (The converse is also
true.) It is therefore sufficient to show that the equations
(see eqs. (22) (23) in the text),
(A.l) pA —açt'g(x)h=0
(A.2) (ahx—y)* = 0
provide a unique solution for Ii and x. Usingthefirst order condition
(15), (A.l) can be written:
(A.3) p +ah17) =0.
And, of course, since iJ >0,(A.2) implies,
(A.') alix—y0.
Since, under our assumptions, is monotonicafly increasing in
x, a solution to (A.3)—(A.b) exists and it must be unique..
It remains to verify that it is an admisab1e solu-
tion,i.e. that 0<x°<l, 0<h0<l. That x0,h0 >0is obvious.. Also
<isince'(U= • Itremains to show that h° =_t.=2.—xLI
g(l) 0a(0 ax gxA-2
Let us define F(x) Clearly F'(x) > 0. We wish to show
that > SinceF(x) is monotonicafly increasing, this is
equivalent to the requirement F(x°) > But F(x°) =tbr
defini-
tion. It is therefore necessary to show that:
g'org(1) >_ag.(i).
g()
Note,however, that 2. = — 1<—1 It is therefore sufficient
to show that
>(1—)(—g'(-)) .
Butthis last inequality follows directly from the assted conorr;ity
of g(x).(It states that g(l) =0is greater than the first—order
Taylor expansion around x =y/a.)
Shape of the Stationary Loci
Due tothe concavity of the Hamiltonian in the controls, the
twonecessary conditions (114)—(15) define a unique pair (h,x) for








—g(x) x— <0 —
v"(l—h)' — pgt'(x)
Thus, considered as a pair of equations in A and i,(A.3)—(Ai)
become:
o= (x,*) pA - ag[X(A,,)JU(X,)
0 =r2(x,*)aH(A,)X(A,*)—A-3
We wish to show the Jacobian of this system evaluated at
is positive. This implies that the A =0line cuts the '= 0








Owing to the signs of X, X, Hx 11* the only negative term




Butthis cancels out with the term:
a2h2g(x)X = >
soJ >0.Q.E.D.
We now prove two further properties of the loci:
(a) the ijaO and A=O loci have positive
slopes at xl and x0 respectively;
(b) along the 4=0 locus, d(A/4)/d4? c 0




di X=O p—ahg (x)X—a(x)H
A
At the border between regions II and III x =0,which implies !5r0.





F xH +hX a.s_ *
d4' $=O2 XHx ÷
At the border between regions I and II x=1, which implies R =0.
Again, given the signs of and it follows that
>0at this point. In order to determine the concavity
properties of the ij'=O and O lines, it is convenient to write
the solution of the first order conditions (l4)—(l5) as function
of the level of A and the ratio .Thus:
x=Xc(A4)
whereXOY(>0
ii=WA,A) Hx >0 'C0.
*
'p
Considernowthecondition A =0or p +ag(x)h =0.Since
g (x)
A
an increase inraises x, which decreases the quantity
in absolute value, an increase in A (which will increase h). is
necessary to restore equality. Thus along the A0 line
d4) —
dA
>0.A similar argument, based on writing h as lvH(*c)
• . d4)
that nlongthe 0line cje must have <0.
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